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THE ROLE OF THE CIVEX PROCESS IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
Thomas E. Eaton and Joseph C. Carter
Mechanical Engineering Department
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky

Abstract
The United States is committed to policies which would assure
that the international, commercial nuclear industry cannot be
exploited as a source of materials for nuclear weapons. The
Civex process provides for a proliferation-resistant fast breed
er reactor fuel cycle. Nevertheless, the risk of nuclear weap
ons proliferation involving the commercial nuclear industry is
small compared to the risk associated with certain research
facilities and military activities.

1. INTRODUCTION
The availability of nuclear weapons to all
countries and possibily to criminal/terrorist groups is potentially the most serious
problem facing the international community
today.
The current policy of the United Ftates is
to take a strong position against nuclear
fuel reprocessincr until definite measures
can be taken to insure that the civilian
nuclear program, cannot be used to supply
the materials required for the prolifer
ation of nuclear weapons.
The justificaiton for and consequences of
this policy involve complex interrelation
ships between the commercial nuclear in
dustry (both domestic and foreign), nuc
lear weapons technology, international
security, and international politics.

2.

SUMMARY

In spite of U.S. nuclear policy and as a
consequence of the OPEC oil embaroo, the
international community apparently has made
a firm decision to build conventional nuc
lear power plants and to develoo the fast
breeder reactor (FBR). The FBR, when fully
operational, can operate on readily avail
able and inexpensive uranium materials.
However, the FBR fuel cycle does involve
fuel reprocessing to separate the pluton
ium discharged from the reactor.
The
plutonium must then be refabricated, into
fuel assemblies for further use as FBR
fuel.
Until recently, commercial nuclear power
plants planned to use the Purex orocess
for fuel reprocessinar this method

produces pure plutonium.
The Civex process,
i.e., Civilian Extraction process, was pro
posed as a substitute for the Purex process
with the hope that the continued development
of the FBR would, be encouraged.
The Civex
process produces a highly radioactive mix
ture of plutonium, uranium, and. fission
products instead of pure plutonium.
There are many ways weapons materials can
be obtained.
The objective of using the
Civex process is to make it very difficult
to obtain plutonium form the operation of
those types of power reactors which are
of current and proposed designs, i.e.,
lirrht water reactors (LWR's) and FBR's,
respectively.
Even if fuel material was diverted from the
Civex fuel cycle, it would be nearly impos
sible to fabricate such material into nuc
lear weapons.
Military weapons procrrans must continue to
use the Purex process while the commercial
nuclear industry can use the Civex process
with little economic penalty.
The potential for successful nuclear weapons
proliferation is considered to be greater
from the process of producing nuclear weapons
and from the theft of weaoons from nuclear
arsenals than from the commercial nuclear
industry.
The concern over the diversion of reproces
sed commercial reactor fuel for use in
weaoons proliferation must be placed in
oroDer nrosoective.
"Reactor Grade" mater
ials are at best only marginally suitable
for use in weapons.
"Weapon's Grade" nuc
lear materials can be obtained with less
difficulty and less expense outside the
commercial nuclear power industry.
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It is important to note that any country
can produce nuclear weapons given a
lengthy, expensive, and deliberate effort.
This effort does not require that the
country have commercial nuclear facilities.
3. THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
3.1

LIGHT WATER PEACTOP FUEL CYCLES

In order to place the Civex and Purex spent
nuclear fuel reprocessing systems into
proper perspective, the nuclear fuel cycle
pertaining to both existing commercial LWR's
and proposed FBR's will be discussed.
An overview of the LWR fuel cycle is shown
in Figures 1 and 2. Briefly, a uranium
bearing ore is mined and transferred to a
milling operation. The yellow cake mater
ial leaving the mill contains the natural
ly occurring mixture of uranium isotooes,
namely 0.71% U-235 and 99.29% U-238. "The
isotope U-235 is used as the fuel in a
nuclear power reactor; U-238 cannot be
used directly as fuel. However, inside
a nuclear reactor, excess neutrons absorbed
in U-238 convert it into plutonium, a man
made element. Plutonium-239 and -241 may
also be used as nuclear fuel.
After milling, the yellow cake is convert
ed into uranium hexafloride so that the
isotopic content of U-235 can be increased,
i.e., enriched. The gaseous diffusion
process (used at the U.S. DOE enrichment
plants) is used to enrich the U-235 con
tent of some UFg to about 3.0%; however,
80% to 85% of the UF6 fed into the enrich
ment plant must be discarded as "tails"
the U-235 content of which has been re
duced or depleted to tyoicallv 0.25% to
0.30% u-235.
The slightly enriched UFg stream is con
verted into uranium-oxide UO2 . This en
riched UO2 is then fabricated into nuclear
fuel assemblies. The fuel assemblies
are used in a nuclear power plant for
about three years and then discharged.
The LT*TR spent fuel discharged is stored
temporarily in a large water pool at the
power plant site. Until recently, nuclear
utilities planned to ship their spent fuel
to a Purex fuel reprocessing plant.
Currently, nuclear utilities are expanding
the capacity of their spent fuel storaae
pools.
At this time, the fate of spent LV7R fuel
is uncertain. Fuel reprocessing has
been suspended, and a high-level nuclear
waste disposal policy (required for both
military and commercial nuclear wastes)
has not been formulated by the Federal
government.
The spent fuel discharged from a typical
LWR consists of about 30 metric tonnes
(MT) of fuel per year containing, nom
inally, 0.9% U-235 and 0.6% plutonium;
the balance is U-238 and fission prod
ucts. Fission products are inherently
and intensely radioactive and account

for about 3% of the fuel discharged. The
plutonium discharged from the reactor is
suitable for use as reactor fuel; it is
manufactured or "bred" as the result of
neutron absorption in U-238 (97% of the
uranium in a LWR) during normal reactor
operations, see Figure 3.
By reprocessing spent LWR fuel, the dis
charged uranium and plutonium could be
recycled into LWR reactors. Using re
cycled U and. Pu, nuclear fuel cycle costs
may be reduced as much as 20% to 30% in
the LWR.
3.2

FAST BREEDER REACTOR FUEL CYCLES

The FBR fuel cycle differs significantly
from that of a LWR. A FBP is capable of
producing more plutonium from U-238 than it
consumes during operation. Thus, the FBR
could use all of the materials discharged
from the LWR fuel cycle, i.e., the depleted
uranium "tails" at the enrichment plants,
the plutonium produced in LWR's, and the
uranium discharged from LWR's.
However, the incentive for developing (at
great expense) the technology required to
commercialize the FBR is that the FBR pro
duces plutonium. The only way that this
plutonium can be utilized is by reproces
sing the spent fuel from the FBR.
The
concentrations of uranium and fission pro
ducts in the FBR discharge fuel must be
either removed or significantly reduced
before the plutonium manufactured by the
FBR can be refabricated into fresh fuel
with which to continue FBR operations.
The FBR is particularly attractive because
it produces or breeds more plutonium than
it consumes. This excess plutonium can be
used to fuel other reactors, i.e., either
LWR's or FBR's. Pu utilization in LWR's
does not lend itself to proliferationresistant features because of various dif
ficulties in the LWR fuel cycle.
The FBR fuel cycle is shown in Figure 4.
The FBR recuires a higher nuclear fuel en
richment than does a LWR, typically 15-25%
versus 3%, respectively.
Basically, the
FBR uses depleted uranium as fuel. Pu is
created in the core and blanket regions of
the FBR; the Pu created must be chemically
processed and then fabricated into new fuel
assemblies in order to be further utilized.
The fuel reprocessing operation removes
fission products (FP) and excess depleted
U from the Pu in spent FBR fuel assemblies.
The nuclear fuel reprocessing may be accomp
lished by either the Purex or Civex process.
4.

NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING

Until recently, the domestic Nuclear Industry
had anticipated using the Purex nuclear fuel
reprocessing technique for spent fuel from
both LWR's and FBR's. Fuel reprocessing is
not mandatory for LWR operation but is econ
omically desirable. The Nuclear Industry
has operated for some time assuming that
commercial reprocessing services would be
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available by the late 1970's.
Today, no commercial fuel reprocessing fac
ilities are operating, and the future of
commercial reprocessing in the U.S. is un
certain. Three plants have been constructed:
(A) the Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) plant in
VJest Valley, NY, (B) the Midwest Fuel Recovery
Plant (MFRP) in Morris, IL, and (C) the
Barnwell Reprocessing Plant in Barnwell, SC.
The NFS plant operated several years thereby
demonstrating the feasibility of commercial
LWR fuel reprocessing.
The NFS plant was closed in 1972 for modifi
cations, but subsequent changes in Federal
regulations have resulted in its being clos
ed indefinitely. The MFRP, although complet
ed, was never operated due to major technical
difficulties. The Barnwell facility has been
nearly completed, but has been forced to
defer plans for operation because of the
termination of licesnsing proceedings by
the Federal government [1].
4.1

THE PUREX PROCESS

Simplified schematics of the Purex process
(used by the NFS and Barnwell plants) are
given in Figures 5 and 6. Briefly, the
Purex process performs three principal op
erations: (A) dissolving the spent fuel,
(B) extracting fission products from the
solution and (C) partitioning or separ
ating the uranium from the plutonium.
Referring to Figure 6, the Purex process
begins with a mechanical "chop-leach" oper
ation; the fuel elements are chopped into
small pieces which are subsequently dis
solved in nitric acid. All materials
are dissolved except the fuel cladding
material. The aqueous solution goes to
an extraction operation where the uranyl
nitrate and plutonium nitrate are extracted
from the fission product nitrates by an
organic solvent. The high level, liquid
FP waste goes to interim storage in large
tanks at the reprocessing plant.
The U and Pu nitrates dissolved in organic
solvent are transferred to a column where
the Pu nitrate is removed from the organic
solution by a reducing agent. The uranyl
•titrate organic solution is sent to a
stripping column where the uranyl nitrate
is extracted from the organic solvent by
interaction with water.
The purified or
ganic solvent is returned to the process.
All streams are subject to solvent recov
ery and purification operations. Ulti
mately, Purex process the spent nuclear
fuel into four products: (A) scrap clad
ding, (B) fission product wastes, (C)
pure uranium, and (D) pure plutonium. The
Purex process is described in detail in
Benedict and Pigford [2],
4.2

THE CIVILIAN EXTRACTION PROCESS

The Civex nuclear fuel reprocessing techni
que has recently been promoted by various
nuclear industry spokesmen, principally with
the prompting of the Electric Power Research

Institute (EPRI). Basically, the Civex
process produces a highly radioactive mix
ture of denatured plutonium, that is, a
mixture of U+Pu+FP.
The Civex process
differs somewhat from Purex.
Importantly,
the Pu product stream from Civex is much
more difficult to handle; therefore, it is
inherently more diversion resistant than the
purified plutonium product from the Purex
process.
A typical FBR fuel cycle employing the Civex
process is shown in Figure 7. Note that the
Civex process plant and the fuel fabrication
operation are integrated into one facility.
As may be seen in Figure 8, the Civex proc
ess begins with a mechanical chop-leach step
The acid solution containing U+Pu+FP goes to
an extraction operation which removes mostbut importantly not all-of the fission
products from the fuel fabrication stream.
The fuel stream moves to a partitioning
operation where it is split into two streams
an excess uranium stream (U+FP) and the
final fuel fabrication stream.
The U+FP stream goes to a purification oper
ation which produces a pure U product and
an additional FP waste stream.
The U prod
uct may be fabricated into blanket assemb
lies. The U+Pu+FP stream is further proc
essed and fabricated into fuel assemblies.
The U+Pu+FP stream is over 75% U; the bal
ance is about 20% Pu and a few per cent
FP [3].
At no point in the fuel recycling operations
is the plutonium chemically separated from
the uranium and fission products contained
in the partitioned fuel fabrication stream.
The Civex process offers other proliferat
ion-resistant features relating to plant
design [3]. The excess uranium purifi
cation purification process will not purify
plutonium. Neither the extraction or part
itioning operations include fission product
scrubbing operations.
Basically, the Civex
process cannot be manipulated to produce
pure plutonium.
Finally, all processing and
fabrication scraps are returned to the front
end of the process to minimize material
unaccounted for (MUF).
4.3

CIVEX PROCESS PENALTIES

The major difficulty with deploying Civex
in the FBR fuel cycle is the fabrication
and handling of the radioactive U+Pu+FP
during the fuel recycling phase. Although
the U+FP in the fuel invoke a small nuclear
penalty in the FBR, the principal impact is
the expense of fabrication of the radioact
ive fuel material into fuel assemblies.
The fuel fabrication cost with Civex may be
estimated to be about ten times as much as
that for the Purex process. Quantitatively,
Civex fuel fabrication is expected to cost
$1500 to $2000/kg. Since FBR fuel has an
eauivalent heatina value of about 4,000
MBTU/lbm, the cost penalty associated with
using the Civex process with the FBR fuel
cycle would be in the range of 15C/MBTU to
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25C/MBTU.
Because the Purex and Civex fuel processing
operations are similar, the actual fuel re
processing costs associated with either pro
cess should be similar. The highly radio
active Civex fuel as well as the FBP. spent
fuel must be shipped in a special shielded
cask.
Since the discharge fuel is reproces
sed at the same facility where the Civex
fuel is fabricated, the main effect of
Civex on fuel shipping would be that the
shipping cask would return to the FBR load
ed instead of empty. Thus, fuel shipping
charge penalties for Civex fuel would be
minimal.
4.4

CIVEX AND THE LWR

Civex is required for the proliferationresistant FBR fuel cycle; however, Civex
can also play an important role in the LWR
fuel cycle.
Many LWR's have been designed and construct
ed based on the assumption that spent fuel
would be shipped off-site and reprocessed.
Consequently, LWR's have storage pools
capable of storing less than 5 years of
spent reactor fuel. Although many reactor
sites have redesigned their spent fuel
storage racks, the storage capacity at most
plants continues to be less than 10 years
of reactor discharge. Importantly, a LWR
has an operating life of 30 years.
With Purex LWR fuel reprocessing plants
closed and no program available for perman
ently disposing of nuclear wastes, spent
LWR fuel is accummulating in spent fuel
pools. At this time, the future of LWR
spent fuel is uncertain. For the interm,
it must be stored. Unless the problems
with the "back-end" of the LWR fuel cycle
are solved in a timely fashion, the entire
LWR nuclear industry will be penalized.
The proposed Civex process could be very
beneficial to LWR systems. While Purex
may not be used for LWR fuel reprocessincr
due to current regulations, Civex could be.
This would require a specially designed
Civex plant, but proliferation-resistant
features would apply as equally to repro
cessed spent LWR fuel as to reprocessed
FBR fuel.
LWR fuel could be processed by Civex in
a manner similar to that for FBR fuel.
The output streams would be similar; the
excess uranium stream would be slightly
enriched and considerably larger than
the fuel stream. The excess uranium
could be recycled to the LWR, the fuel
stream (U+Pu+FP) could be fabricated for
the FBR. The Civex process could thus
relieve anxieties in the LWR community
and provide fuel for FBR's.
Recycling the Civex fuel into the LWR
would probably not be economical. The
penalties associated with using Civex for
Pu recycle are higher for the LWR than the
FBR. The alternate cost of purchasing en
riched uranium and using conventional fab

rication should delay the need for LWR
Pu recycle using Civex.
5. NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
5.1

THE TEPEAT TO PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Given the increasing frequency of ter
rorist activities throughout the world and
the continuing occurrence of international
tension and conflict among the small nations
of the world, the proliferation of nuclear
weapons to small countries, criminals, or
terrorists is a serious threat to peace —
perhaps the most serious problem facing the
international community today.
Although properly designed nuclear weapons
have the potential to produce significant
loss of life and property damage; they also
introduce a strono uncertainty into the
control of the enormous nuclear arsenals of
the Super-powers.
5.2

THE PROLIFERATION ALTERNATIVES

Groups desiring a nuclear weapon have two
alternatives; they may try to build one, or
they may try to steal one. Those desiring
to build a weapon have several alternatives
for acquiring the special nuclear materials
(SNM) required: they may enrich uranium,
they may manufacture plutonium, they may
divert materials from the commercial nuclear
fuel cycle, they may divert materials from
the military and research reactor fuel cycle,
or they may divert materials from the mili
tary weapons program.
5.3

PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR POWER

Concerning the possibility of producing
weapons material, C. Starr of EPRI has shown
that commercial nuclear power facilities,
i.e., diffusion plants and power reactors,
are the least likely of the methods avail
able. This is because the required cost,
technology, and industrial scale are all
larger for commercial power facilities than
for the alternatives [4].
The alternatives available include other
reactor types and other enrichment techni
ques. Alternate reactors include research,
military, and production types. Starr has
reported that the research reactor could be
used to produce weapon material with minimal
difficulty [4].
Production reactors, gas centrifuge enrich
ment, and high energy accelerators could be
used with a difficulty intermediate between
that for research reactors and for commercial
power [4].
With commercial nuclear power expanding
rapidly overseas, considerable interest has
developed in alternate enrichment techniques.
Various aerodynamic, electromagnetic (laser)/
and other technologies are being developed.
In the future, these technologies may play
an important role in weapons proliferation.
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5.4

THE CURRENT DOMESTIC NUCLEAR POLICY

U.S. naval and certain research reactors.

The current administration has taken strong
measures against both the domestic and the
international commercial nuclear industries
in order to assure that the civilian nuclear
power program cannot be exploited to yield
the special nuclear materials required for
weapons proliferation.

Importantly, reactor arade plutonium is
contaminated with about 25% Pu-240; the
presence of this material makes weapons
design much more difficult. [5]. Further,
the Pu-240 assures that the yield from the
weapon will be relatively small and that the
probability of detonation is small.

For the U.S. Nuclear Industry, these polic
ies have lead to a termination of commercial
spent nuclear fuel reprocessing activities
and to a slow-down in the development of
the FBR. Both actions are intended to min
imize the potential for diverting reactor
plutonium for weapons proliferation.

With Civex, pure plutonium would not be
available from the commercial fuel cycle.
Indeed, even if the fission products in the
fabricated fuel were removed, the uranium
remaining with the plutonium would denature
the mixture. The chemical separation of
plutonium from Civex fuel requires a Purex
fuel reprocessing plant.

The justification and conseouences of
today's nuclear energy policies involve
complex interrelationships between the
commercial nuclear industry (domestic and
foreign) , nuclear weapons technoloay, inter
national politics, and international secur
ity.
5.5

THE ROLE OF THE CIVEX PROCESS

In order to encourage the continued develooment of the FBR, the Civex process was pro
posed by leaders of EPRI and of the UK
Atomic Energy Authority. Civex is to be a
substitute for the Purex process. Either
Civex or Purex fuel reprocessing is a must
in the FBR fuel cycle;otherwise the FBR is
a futile exercise.
The proliferation-resistant advantage of
Civex is that it does not and cannot produce
pure plutonium. Neglecting safeguards, Pure
plutonium would be relatively easy to divert
from the commercial fuel cycle.
5.6

NUCLEAR V7EAP0NS FROM REACTOR PLUTONIUM

Although it is a moot point, it is important
to point out that even pure plutonium dis
charged from power reactors, i.e., "reactor
grade plutonium," is an extremely poor mat
erial to use in the construction of a nuc
lear weapon.
The technology associated with the design
and construction of a nuclear weapon is
extremely complex. The fabrication is fur
ther complicated by the requirement for
special nuclear materials, i.e., either
highly enriched uranium (93%+ U-235) or
pure, weapon grade plutonium (93%+ Pu-239).
Therefore, the proper materials for weapon
construction require either uranium enrich
ment or plutonium production; each method is
complex and expensive.
The only materials in commercial nuclear
fuel cycles even remotely suitable for
weapons are those fed into and discharged
from the reactor. Spent fuel is intensely
radioactive and extremely difficult to
handle. The only material which could
be used for a weapon is plutonium. Nowhere
in the fuel cycle is uranium enrichment
sufficient to be considered weaoon arade.

5.7

THE NUCLEAR ARSENALS

Clearly, the easiest way to overcome the
problems of designing and fabricating a
nuclear weapon is simply to steal one.
Alternately, complications of designing and
fabricating nuclear weapons can be markedly
reduced if weapons grade material can be
diverted from the military nuclear industry.
There are about 30,000 nuclear weapons in
the U.S. military arsenal, and over 50,000
throughout the world [6,7]. Needless-to-say,
the materials for these weapons are shipped
frequently in many countries. Further, the
weapons themselves are shipped, stored, and
deployed,not only throughout the United
States, but all over the globe.
Admittedly nuclear weapons have numerous
elaborate safety devices.
However, the
weapons are designed to reliably produce
high energy yields if used by authorized
personnel.
The potential for weapons
proliferation from the military nuclear
industries and arsenals may be more serious
than from the commercial nuclear industry.
Further, the military programs must contin
ue to use the Purex process while the com
mercial nuclear industry can use the Civex
process with little penalty.
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The Nuclear Fuel Cycle for the Light W ater Reactor

Mining. The extraction of
uranium ore embedded in
sandstone. The grades of
ore currently mined yield
four to five pounds of ura
nium dioxide -U O 2 - per
ton of ore. A typical 1.000
megawatt electric power
plant w ill use the UO 2
fro m 125,000 tons of ore
each year.

M illing. The process by
which ore is crushed,
ground, leached w ith acid,
and purified into a uranium
oxide - U 3O Q - known as
yellowcake. A bout 125,000
tons o f ore must be m illed
to obtain 240 tons of
yellowcake; the remainder
is waste material called
tailings, which have a low
level of radioactivity.

* Taken from Reference [9].

Conversion. The conversion
of yellowcake into a hexa
fluoride fo rm — UFg. UFg
is solid at room tempera
ture. but it becomes a gas
w ith a small increase in
tem perature and pressure.
When converted, 240 tons
of yellowcake becomes
300 tons of UFg.

Enrichment. Raising the
concentration of U 235
isotopes in UFg enough to
sustain a controlled chain
reaction and thus gener
ate power. Before enrich
ment, the uranium in UFg
contains only about 0.7
percent U 235 and about
99.3 percent U 238 L'9ht
water reactors now in use
need UFg enriched to a
concentration of about 3
percent U235- 300 tons
of converted U.Fg yields
about 40 tons o f enriched
UFg and about 260 tons
of depleted uranium,
called tails.

Fabrication. The process
by which enriched UFg
is converted tc solid UO 2
and fabricated into c y lin 
ders roughly one-half inch
in diameter by several
inches long. These are then
assembled in to varying
configurations of fuel rods,
which are inserted in to the
reactor core.

Light Water Reactor. A
poyver generator that uses
a controlled fission chain
reaction to produce electri
city, waste heat, and radio
active waste including spent
fuel. The core holds roughly
100 tons of UO 2 . In a
1,000 megawatt reactor, a

Reprocessing. The process
by w hich spent fuel is
Droken down into UO 2
and plutonrum oxide
(Pu 02 ) and radioactive
waste components. A bo u t
one-third of the spent fuel
in the core of a reactor is
replaced each year. Repro

ton or more o f U 235 is
fissioned in a year's time.

cessing yields about 30
tons o f usable uranium,
which can be channeled
back as UFgthrough the
enrichment process and
about one-third of a ton of
Pu 02 , which can be sent
into the fabrication
process. (For details, see
the preceding diagram.)

Storage o f Radioactive
Waste. The permanent or
tem porary storage of spent
fuei. It is assumed that
highly radioactive waste
fro m civilian and m ilita ry
nuclear activities w ill be
stored in salt or granite
deposits. This storage plan
has not yet been dem on
strated on a large scale.

FIGURE 3
MATERIAL BALANCE FOR A TYPICAL LIGHT WATER REACTOR
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE (Taken from Reference [10])

FIGURE 4
MATERIAL BALANCE FOR A TYPICAL FAST BPEEDER REACTOR
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE (Taken from Reference [10]).
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FIGURE 5
PUREX PROCESS OPERATIONS
(Taken from Reference [11])

ILEAN ORGANIC SOLVENT

"Economics of Nuclear
Power," Spring 1973.

*

FIGURE 6
A SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC OF THE PURFX PROCESS FOR NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING
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U 238 -Uranium

238

Pu - Plutonium

FIGURE 7
THE CIVEX PROCESS IN A TYPICAL
FAST BREEDER REACTOR FUEL CYCLE

FIGURE 8
A SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF THE CIVEX PROCESS FOR FUEL REPROCESSING
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